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User-centric Privacy 
Engineering for the 
Internet of Things 
 
User privacy concerns are widely regarded as a key obstacle to the 
success of modern smart cyber-physical systems. In this paper, we 
analyse, through an example, some of the requirements that future 
data collection architectures of these systems should implement to 
provide effective privacy protection for users. Then, we give an 
example of how these requirements can be implemented in a smart 
home scenario. Our example architecture allows the user to balance 
the privacy risks with the potential benefits and take a practical 
decision determining the extent of the sharing. Based on this 
example architecture, we identify a number of challenges that must be addressed by future data 
processing systems in order to achieve effective privacy management for smart cyber-physical 
systems. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
We progressively find ourselves surrounded by smart cyber-physical systems that silently track 
our activities and collect sensitive information about us. Among the most prominent examples, we 
cite smart energy grids, smart transportation networks, smart homes and cities, etc. However, 
while such systems promise to ease our lives, they raise major privacy concerns for their users, as 
the data collected is often privacy-sensitive, such as location and habits of individuals, patients' 
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vital signs, etc. In fact, collected data could be misused by the providers of such systems or even 
sold to interested third parties and exploited for various purposes 1, 2.  
 
Recent privacy and data protection laws 3 called for more involvement of users in protecting their 
data by enabling them to control what is collected about them, when, by whom and for what pur-
poses. However, existing solutions 4, 5, 6, 7 for privacy protection in cyber-physical systems fall 
short of that objective. Most of these solutions are inspired by the old approach employed in data-
bases to ensure the privacy of users 8. In that approach, the user is required by the system to pro-
vide her data, then she is prompted to specify her privacy preferences (through a set of variables) 
as to who can access the data and for what purposes, and to accept a privacy policy specifying a 
set of rules that may refer to her preferences. Subsequently, the rules are applied to all queries re-
ceived by the system before returning the result. Unfortunately, such an approach does not provide 
effective protection of privacy. In fact, the user does not always understand the privacy policy 9, 
which could be incomplete, and may not be necessarily aware of the direct and indirect risks that 
may be associated with the disclosure of her data to a given entity in order to correctly specify her 
privacy preferences.  
 
The successful involvement of users in protecting their data and ensuring their privacy requires 
two main conditions to be met. First, the user should be empowered to understand the privacy 
risks associated with the disclosure of a piece of data to a given entity and to balance these risks 
with the potential benefits of the disclosure to be able to take a meaningful privacy decision as to 
disclose or not, and to what extent. Privacy decisions are intrinsically difficult due to their delayed 
and uncertain consequences that are hard to compare with the immediate rewards of data disclo-
sure. Second, the user should be provided with the necessary tools to implement her privacy deci-
sion by controlling the disclosure level. For example, different data degradation strategies may be 
used to modify the accuracy of the to-be-disclosed data item to achieve the chosen trade-off be-
tween the risks and the benefits.  
 
In this article, we present a vision of how users of smart cyber-physical systems (e.g., Internet of 
Things) can be empowered to take a central and effective role in protecting their privacy. We ma-
terialise our vision by the proposition of a reference data sharing architecture that allows users to 
take flexible and practical data sharing decisions that reconcile their privacy requirements with 
their desires to be rewarded. We also validated our vision by implementing the proposed architec-
ture within a smart environment to monitor chronic patients at home. 
 
Compared to similar works 4,5,6,7 that sought to involve users in protecting their data such our solu-
tion has the following advantages. First, it allows end-users to assess the implicit privacy risks that 
are associated with the release of their data, compare them in a meaningful way with the benefits 
to choose the best data protection level. Second, privacy protection is ensured in a pragmatic way, 
allowing users to take a pragmatic stance between their interests and the risks implied.  Third, our 
solution does not protect privacy in a rigid way, i.e., as context changes, inferred privacy risks 
change as well, and so is the protection ensured by the solution, allowing for more responsiveness 
to surrounding IoT environment. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2, analyses some of the key require-
ments for effective privacy protection in smart cyber-physical systems. Sections 3 and 4 present an 
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example of an architecture implementing the identified requirements in a smart home scenario. 
Section 5 concludes the paper by pointing out future research directions. 
 
2. PRIVACY FOR SMART CYBER-PHYSICAL 
SYSTEMS – A WALKING THROUGH EXAMPLE 
Assume that Alice is the owner of a smart home featuring different types of smart appliances in-
cluding: a refrigerator, stove, microwave, etc. Alice is a CDK (Chronic Kidney Disease) patient 
and has a home haemodialysis machine. The environment includes also smart meters for measur-
ing the energy consumption, and different types of sensors including light, presence and tempera-
ture sensors, etc. These appliances, sensors and meters generate important data volumes that could 
be exploited by different entities for achieving different purposes.  
 
Utilities and edge services: The electricity provider of Alice would be interested in exploiting the 
generated data (e.g., the energy consumption) to improve the energy distribution across the city 
and avoid service cut-offs. It can also use it to provide Alice with personalized recommendations 
for reducing her energy consumption and bills. Edge services include businesses providing ser-
vices to energy consumers based on energy consumption data. Examples of services include, real-
time energy usage monitoring to optimize the consumption (e.g., by proposing actions to users 
such as turning on/off a certain device, etc.), raising the energy awareness by allowing consumers 
to monitor their carbon emissions and compare them to those of friends on social media, etc.  
 
Law enforcement agencies: They may use the collected data for different purposes, such as per-
forming real-time (or near real-time) surveillance on suspects by determining if they are present 
and their current activities inside the home. Police investigators may also screen the energy con-
sumption records of the utility to identify houses where some illegal activities may take place, e.g., 
potential drug production sites across the city.  
 
Marketers: Marketers may be interested in determining the living profile of Alice to 
send her targeted advertisements. For example, they may be interested in knowing the 
appliances she may or may not own, or her eating patterns to send her special offers, 
etc. 
 
2.1 Privacy concerns 
The cited possible data uses may raise several privacy concerns for Alice. First, even though Alice 
may be interested in reaping the benefits offered by a utility or some edge services, like for in-
stance the usage optimization of her appliances, either by explicitly providing detailed information 
about the appliances’ usage or by providing energy consumption data that is granular enough to 
infer the appliances usage (through their consumption signatures 10), she may not want to disclose 
the fact that she is a CKD patient (through the use of her haemodialysis machine). Such sensitive 
information, if was disclosed inadvertently or intentionally by one of the entities processing her 
data, would irreversibly affect her professional and social life. Second, Alice may not wish to dis-
close her habits and living style, e.g., presence/absence, walking/sleeping, eating and watching TV 
patterns, etc. Such information, if misused, would harm her in different ways, e.g., she might be-
come a target for housebreakers, or get penalized by her employers and/or her social entourage, 
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etc. Alice, may not wish to be under permanent surveillance. This would make her feel uncomfort-
able and impact her natural behaviour. 
 
 
In this work, we uphold the privacy definition given in 11, where the privacy is described as con-
sisting of four dimensions: (1) privacy of the personal information, (2) privacy of the person (i.e., the in-
tegrity of her body), (3) privacy of personal behaviour and (4) privacy of personal communications. We 
therefore consider all the data items that may be used to compromise the privacy of a person in at 
least one of these dimensions as sensitive. 
 
2.2 Practical privacy decisions 
 
Alice is also a pragmatic person and may be willing to trade off the anticipated benefits (of sharing 
some of her data with some of the cited entities) with the potential privacy risks and make compro-
mises. For example, she may accept to release fine-grained energy consumption data (i.e., con-
sumption readings with high sampling frequency) to her electricity provider to help it better 
optimize its energy distribution, provided some financial benefits (e.g., bill reductions or bonuses, 
etc.). She may also accept to share with an edge service only the data necessary to compute her 
daily carbon emission and compare it with those of friends on a social network (to gain some so-
cial recognition), but not to infer the list of owned appliances.  Similarly, she may accept to pro-
vide law enforcement services with the necessary data to check for illegal activities, but not to 
perform real-time surveillance. 
 
 
In all of these examples, Alice takes her practical decision after evaluating how trustworthy the 
data consumer is, and for what purposes (that potentially relate to her privacy requirements and 
preferences) the released data can be exploited, and what are the benefits of the data sharing deci-
sion. 
 
2.3 Identified requirements 
 
Based on our simple example, we identify below some of the key requirements for ensuring effec-
tive privacy protection for cyber-physical systems. 
 
R1: User-centric privacy protection: As required by data protection regulations, users (i.e., data 
owners) should be enabled to play a central role in protecting their data. This implies that before 
sharing a data item with a given data consumer, the user should be (i) enabled to understand the 
privacy risks that pertain to her subjective vision of privacy, and (ii) provided with the necessary 
mechanisms to control the extent of the sharing. For example, the data sharing architecture 
should warn Alice, before releasing her fine-grained energy consumption readings to her electricity 
provider or to an edge service, that these bodies may determine her appliances (based on their signa-
tures) and consequently know that she is a CDK patient. It should also allow Alice to reduce the 
frequency of released energy consumption readings to prevent such privacy breach. 
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R2: Pragmatic privacy decision making: Studies 12 showed that users, in practice, tend to take a 
pragmatic stance on sharing their private data, i.e., they would accept the release of some of their 
private data in return for some incentives. This has motivated an important drive in the database 
research field to monetize private data, based on potential privacy risks, and compensate end users 
directly 13. Based on that observation, privacy protection in cyber-physical systems should not be 
ensured in a rigid fashion by deciding whether a data item should be shared with a given entity or 
not. Rather, users (e.g., Alice) should be empowered to assess the privacy risks that they accept to 
take, balance them against the benefits offered by data consumers, and potentially negotiate with 
data consumers before taking their sharing decisions. Data owners and consumers will play roles 
very much similar to the roles of sellers and buyers in a free market, where buyers and sellers may 
bargain with each other to reach a suitable deal. 
 
R3: Adaptive privacy protection to cope with context evolution: The data sharing decision may 
depend on user's context. For example, Alice may accept, in the general case, to release fine-
grained energy consumption data to her electricity provider that would allow the latter to infer her 
appliances usage, but not when she uses her haemodialysis machine. The data sharing architecture 
should detect the context changes that would lead to privacy breaches and take the necessary ac-
tions to avoid them. For instance, the architecture could warn Alice when she turns on her medical 
machine about the potential leakage of her health condition to her energy provider and could pro-
pose to her to decrease the sampling frequency of the released energy consumption readings. 
 
 
3. A REFERENCE DATA SHARING ARCHITECTURE 
FOR USER-CENTRIC PRIVACY PRESERVATION 
FOR IoT 
 
In this section, we describe an example of a data sharing architecture for a smart home that satisfies 
the requirements discussed above and gives the control over data sharing back to end-users.  
 
3.1 Architecture overview 
We use the terms “data owners” to designate the users of cyber-physical systems that generate 
data by interacting with the systems (e.g., occupants of smart homes, monitored patients, etc.), and 
“data consumers” to designate the stakeholders that are interested in collecting and exploiting the 
data generated, such as electricity companies in smart grids, healthcare providers in intelligent 
healthcare networks, third-parties that would provide data owners with smart services, etc.  
In our architecture (Figure-1) raw data generated by connected things (IoT objects) is stored 
within a Personal Data Store before released to data consumers. All data flows between data own-
ers and consumers pass by the proposed reference architecture. When a data consumer queries a 
data item from a data owner (either directly, or by getting the data owner to use a service/applica-
tion provided by data consumer), our architecture processes the received query as follows: 
● It assesses, through the Privacy Risks Inference component (or the Privacy Oracle), the risks 
associated with releasing the requested data to data consumer. Since privacy is a subjective 
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notion (i.e., different people may be concerned with different privacy risks), the privacy ora-
cle takes into account several factors including the profile of data owner, her context, her 
trust in data consumer, etc. Context is a key input to the privacy oracle, it is monitored in a 
continuous way (by observing the data sent by IoT objects) and exploited in identifying the 
risks. 
● Then, it monetizes (i.e., quantifies) the identified privacy risks and the potential benefits us-
ing a numerical model, through the Trade-off Data Sharing component (TDS), and helps data 
owner take a pragmatic decision balancing the two. The decision denotes the data items that 
can be shared with the consumer, along with their accuracy (i.e., precision). Data owners and 
consumers could also negotiate before reaching a pragmatic data sharing decision. 
● Finally, it modifies, through the Query/Result Modification component (QRM), the query be-
fore being applied to the personal data store to discard the data items to which the data con-
sumer is not entitled, and the query’s result to change its accuracy before its release.   
 
Privacy risks closely relate to what can be inferred from collected data. For example, granular 
readings of smart electricity meters can be analysed to infer information about the occupants such 
as their presence/absence, the possession of specific devices. The disclosure of such information 
could lead to privacy risks such as being subject to discrimination, surveillance, burglaries, etc. 
Our architecture identifies the relevant risks, through the Privacy Risks Inference component, by 
rendering the implicit relationship between raw collected data and risks explicit.  
 
Context changes could lead to privacy breaches in previously taken decisions. Therefore, context is 
monitored and risks are analysed in a permanent way (i.e., old data sharing decisions might be 
recomputed when context changes).  
 
Our architecture would use any data protecting scheme (whose efficacy is proved) to anonymise 
the data once a data sharing decision is taken. For examples, differential privacy can be used to al-
ter the precision of released smart meter readings, anonymization can be used to anonymise the lo-
cation, etc. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: A reference architecture for allowing the users of IoT smart systems to control their data 
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3.2 Privacy risks/benefits trade-off model 
 
We present in this subsection our model to trade off the privacy risks with the data sharing bene-
fits. Our model builds on previous works on trade-off decision models such as 14. The model is 
shown in Figure 2. The trade-off decision is taken based on two factors: the privacy risks associated 
with answering the query q of the data consumer d, and the benefits generated by the query answer-
ing. The privacy risks factor has a negative impact on the trade-off decision, whereas the benefits fac-
tor has a positive one. The privacy risks are measured based on three factors: (1) the sensitivity of the 
data items requested in q, (2) the trust in the recipient d (i.e., data consumer), and (3)  the information 
leakage caused by answering q. We will define all of these factors, and how they can be computed 
in subsequent subsections. We define below the trade-off privacy decision. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Privacy risks/benefit trade-off model 
 
 
Definition 1: (Trade-off privacy decision) the decision to answer the query q of the data consumer 
d is computed as follows: 
𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 (𝑞, 𝑑) = {
𝑨𝒏𝒔𝒘𝒆𝒓, 𝑖𝑓 𝑈𝑑(𝑞) > 0
𝑫𝒆𝒏𝒚,              𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒
 
 
where Ud(q) is the utility function of answering q, and it is computed as follows: 
𝑈𝑑 = (1 − 𝑤)  ∗  𝑏𝑑(𝑞)  +  𝑤 ∗  𝑟𝑑(𝑞) 
 
where bd(q) and rd(q) are functions quantifying the benefits and the risks that are generated/caused 
by answering q, respectively. The parameter w can be tuned by the user to bias the benefits/risks 
trade-off decision (e.g., if w = 0.5, the benefits should be at least equal to the risks). In the follow-
ing we detail how rd(q) and bd(q) can be computed. 
 
3.2.1 Measuring the privacy risks 
The privacy risks can be measured based on three factors: the sensitivity of queried data items, the 
trust in the data recipient and the information leakage caused by the release of the data items. We 
discuss these factors in the following. 
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Data sensitivity: the sensitivity of a data item can be determined based on its direct or indirect re-
lations with a privacy sensitive information. For example, the electricity consumption readings are 
not privacy sensitive in themselves, but the fact that they can be analysed by some data mining al-
gorithms 10 to determine the appliances usage and consequently infer the behaviour patterns (e.g., 
waking/sleeping patterns, meal times, etc.) make them sensitive. 
 
The NIST guidelines for smart grid cybersecurity have identified the different privacy-sensitive infor-
mation pieces that could be relevant to a wide range of users in smart home scenarios and that cor-
respond to our vision of privacy. These include: user personal information, presence/absence, real- time 
surveillance, habits, and the use of a specific device. We call these information pieces as the privacy 
parameters and exploit them to compute the sensitivity of a data item 𝒊 (e.g., energy consumption 
data, etc.) as follows. The user is prompted to assign an importance weight to each of the privacy 
parameters 𝑓𝑗(1 ≤  𝑛). Then, whenever a data item 𝒊 is requested by a query, its sensitivity is com-
puted by summing up the weights of all the privacy parameters that relate to (i.e., can be inferred 
from) it by the equation: 
Sensitivity (i)  = ∑ 𝑤𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 (𝑓𝑗)  ∗  𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡 (𝑓𝑗)
𝑛
𝑗=1
 
 
where the function context(fj) ∈ {0, 1}, it takes the value “1” or “0” depending on whether fj is 
relevant or not in the current context. 
 
Trust in recipient: the trust of a user in a data consumer may change depending on the consumer’s 
profile and its history of interaction with users. For example, a law enforcement agency may be 
trusted more than a publicity company, and an electricity provider with which a user has had a long 
and satisfactory history of interaction may be trusted more than an unknown edge service. In our 
model, we can rely on any of the trust models (e.g., 15 ) that compute the trust in a consumer by ag-
gregating and averaging quantitative feedback ratings of users (e.g., smart house owners). 
 
Information leakage: it measures the knowledge leaked to d about the different privacy sensi-
tive parameters fj (1≤ n) when a data item i is disclosed to d. The information leakage relative 
to a particular privacy parameter fj , denoted by  𝐿𝑓𝑗  ,  can be measured by capturing the uncer-
tainty of d about fj and is dependent on the accuracy level of the released 𝒊.   𝐿𝑓𝑗  can be measured 
either analytically or experimentally. For example, the experimental studies in 10 showed that releas-
ing the energy consumption with a good accuracy (i.e., sampling frequency of 15 seconds) leads 
to determining the eating habits with a confidence degree of 59% and the appliance use with a 
confidence degree of 72%, but when the sampling frequency drops to 30 minutes these two confi-
dence degrees drop to near 0. 
 
 
3.2.1 Measuring the benefits 
Different types of benefits require different kinds of measurements. For example, the usage optimiza-
tion advices that would lead to less energy consumption, bonuses and bill reductions that one could 
receive from her electricity provider can be quantified by their introduced financial gain. The ben-
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efits of sharing fine-grained data with law enforcement agencies to contribute to securing the liv-
ing environment could be quantified by the one’s feeling of self-satisfaction and patriotism. The ben-
efits of sharing her carbon emission on a social network can be quantified by the social recognition 
she receives. 
 
 
4. REAL-LIFE CASE-STUDY: MONITORING ELDERLY 
AND CHRONIC PATIENTS 
We implemented our reference architecture within a smart environment for monitoring chronic pa-
tients. The environment involves wearable sensors for monitoring several vital signs such as heart 
rates, blood pressure, ECG as well as smart objects and sensors installed in fixed positions of the 
monitored environment. The study involved 20 real patients with ages from 20 to 67 years.   
Figure 3 shows the implementation architecture. Collected raw data are stored within a personal 
data vault (PDV) that provides a simple implementation of the different component of our archi-
tecture. Healthcare providers provide patients, through a dedicated mobile application, with per-
sonalized healthcare services by consuming collected data. Data flows between users (i.e., 
patients) and data consumers (healthcare providers) go through the PDV. 
 
 
Figure 3: Implementation of the proposed architecture within an IoT environment for monitoring 
chronic patients 
 
 
We implemented the privacy risk inference component as a knowledgebase. Collected data, con-
text elements and associated risks are modelled by a domain ontology. The knowledgebase models 
the implicit relationship between raw data and risks by a set of inference rules (expressed in the 
Semantic Web Rule Language SWRL).  We present in Figure 4 simplified examples of inference 
rules. Rule-1 states that the use of a device can be inferred from the readings of an energy smart 
meter (EMR). The terms “Person”, “EMR”, “Device” are ontological concepts, whereas 
“hasEMR”, “isShared”, “useDevice”, “isInferrable” are properties. Rule-2 states that the use of a 
medical device reveals the health conditions for which the device is used. Rule-1 and Rule-2 can 
be combined together to infer the fact that the health conditions could be inferred from the read-
ings of an energy smart meter. Rule-3 simply states that “location” and  “heart-rate” metadata 
could be combined to infer if  data owner has an extramarital affair (i.e. heart-rate can be used to 
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infer if  data owner is engaged in a sexual activity, and  location can be exploited to infer whether  
data owner is in a suspicious location (e.g., outside home)). The rule uses contextual information 
such as whether the data owner is married. 
 
 
Figure 4: Sample of inference rules for inferring privacy risks. 
 
 
Figure 5 (Window-1) shows the user interface of the PDV. Upon the reception of a new data request, 
the PDV takes into account the user's context and her shared data (Window-2) to provide her with 
a description of associated privacy risks (Window-3) as well as a set of recommended actions (Win-
dow-4).  
 
 
 
Figure 5: Interaction with end-users to control the release of data 
Rule-1 (Inferring a device usage by Energy Meter Readings EMR): 
Person(?p), hasEMR(?p,?r), EMR(?r), isShared(?r, “true”)  
          useDevice(?p, ?d), Device(?d), isInferrable(?d,“true”)
Rule-2 (Inferring health conditions by a Medical device): 
Person(?p), usesDevice(?p,?r), MedicalDevice(?r), 
cures(?r,?m), disease(?m)               
           hasDisease(?p, ?m)
Rule-3 (Inferring extramarital affairs by location and sexual activity): 
Person(?p), isMarried(?p, “true”) hasASexualActivity (?p,?x), 
isInferable(?x, “true”), hasLocation(?p,?l), isSuspicious(?l, “true”)   
           has(?p, ?f), ExtramaritalAffair(f), isInferable(?f, “true”)
1 2
3 4
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5. CHALLENGES AND OPEN ISSUES 
 
We conclude the paper by identifying some of the key challenges that should be addressed to achieve 
effective privacy protection in cyber-physical systems. 
 
Meaningful data degradation strategies. Smart environments produce a rich set of data elements 
that are different in nature and require different forms of degradation (to implement chosen trade-
off decisions). For example, data elements such as the address or the age of a person can be degraded 
by applying well known data anonymization techniques, whereas the electricity consumption read-
ings can be degraded by reducing the sampling frequency. Research efforts are needed to define for 
each type of data elements suitable degradation strategies, and data degradation levels that map 
directly to their different possible uses (i.e. risks), and to data leakage levels. 
 
Rich pricing models for privacy sensitive data.  Data consumers may offer different forms of bene- 
fits including financial, social, societal benefits, etc. Research efforts are needed to devise rich and 
flexible pricing models (for privacy sensitive data) that would fit for various forms of benefits. 
Efforts are also needed to help users assess the sensitivity of their private data. Crowdsourcing 
techniques can be explored for that purpose. 
 
Context modeling and monitoring for triggering the adaptation. The sensitivity of a data piece 
may depend on the context. For example, the energy consumption data may become sensitive 
when Alice turns on her hemodialysis machine. Models and techniques are needed to represent and 
monitor the context elements that relate to user’s privacy and detect context changes that require 
adapting privacy decisions. Complex Event Processing CEP techniques can be explored for that pur-
pose. In fact, the interaction of users with their surrounding environment generates various events 
that can be monitored. The contexts that require adaptation are represented by a set of events com-
binations that can be tracked by the CEP system. 
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